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OPENINGS FOR FRAMING A PROGRESSIVE FOREIGN POLICY 





 Even at a time of elevated support for current national security policies, the public 
still has deep reservations about those policies, which creates an opening for groups ad-
vocating a different course for American foreign policy.  The public is particularly recep-
tive if such groups frame the elements of an alternative foreign policy – such as devel-
opment assistance, human rights, and a responsible energy policy – in a way that bears 
some relation to the “hard” security agenda of issues such as Iraq and terrorism.  
 
 Although public support for the current national security policies is up somewhat 
in the wake of recent events, such as the capture of Saddam Hussein and the increased 
national threat level during the holiday period, the public still is troubled by many aspects 
of current U.S. foreign policy.  The public worries that we have alienated other countries 
at the expense of America’s security and spent too much time and money on foreign af-
fairs at the expense of domestic priorities.  Moreover, clear majorities of the public have 
not been convinced about the core concepts of current U.S. national security policies, 
such as the necessity of pre-emptive military attacks and unilateral American action 
abroad. 
 
 Given these concerns progressive groups and speakers have opportunities to 
frame their messages in ways that resonate with a majority of the public.  This research 
was undertaken to determine the best ways to move an internationalist policy agenda 
forward; its findings help leaders of progressive NGOs and legislators frame their mes-
sage in the most persuasive way.  In addition to framing their issues in some relation to 
the “hard” security agenda, progressive groups and speakers need to take several steps in 
order to present their issues in the most powerful manner: 
 
• Getting the argument right.  Progressive groups and speakers can do more to 
push back on current foreign policy if they use the right arguments.  For example, 
the public responds more strongly to arguments against the concept of pre-
emption when based on “the long-standing American tradition” of not attacking 
others unless the U.S. is attacked first, rather than on the argument that pre-
emption could make the U.S. look like a “global bully” and therefore alienate 
other countries. 
 
• Audience matters.  Some choices about the message frame for progressive for-
eign policy priorities depend heavily on the audience.  For example, on the ques-





tion of pre-emption, conservatives respond more to an argument against the con-
cept of pre-emption when it is based on the “American tradition” of not attacking 
first; while self-identified liberals respond more to the argument that pre-emption 
risks making the U.S. look like a “global bully.” 
 
• A few variables differentiate the public’s reactions.  A small number of variables 
sharply differentiate public reactions to many elements of the progressive agenda, 
particularly gender, education (both years of schooling and exposure to the world 
through foreign travel), and location (particularly the coasts as opposed to rural 
heartland areas).  
 
• A sizeable foundation of support for a foreign policy premised on more than 
fear.  Although there is elevated support for current national security policies, a 
surprisingly large share of the public shows a desire for a foreign policy that is 
premised not just on fear, but also on a desire to build a peaceful and more pros-
perous world.  Nearly half the public says this is a unique moment for America to 
pursue this kind of foreign policy.  
 
 These are among the key findings of a baseline survey for the Open Society Insti-
tute’s Global Cooperative Engagement project.  The survey was based on telephone in-
terviews with a random nationwide sample of 1,290 civically engaged adults, including a 
sample of 439 foreign policy opinion formers (college educated, follow international af-
fairs closely), conducted December 15-20, 2003.  The survey results are subject to a mar-
gin of sampling error of plus or minus 3.4 percent.  The survey questionnaire was in-
formed by the results of a set of focus groups in Seattle, Washington; Des Moines, Iowa; 
and Washington, DC, conducted December 8-11, 2003.  All participants were civically 
engaged adults; the Washington groups were composed of opinion formers.   
 
 
Despite Post-Saddam Support, Doubts About Current U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
Even at a moment of somewhat elevated support for current U.S. national security 
policies, the American public still has serious doubts about the current approach to world 
affairs, which creates openings for groups proposing progressive and alternative foreign 
policy agendas.  The survey, in particular, was conducted at an unusual moment: it began 
two days after Saddam Hussein was captured, and finished the day before the national 
threat level was raised to Orange.   
 
Saddam’s capture (along with positive economic news during this period) helps 
generate a 9 percent drop since mid-November in the share who see the country headed 
in the wrong direction [Figure1], and a 5 percent rise in the share who feel that Iraq has 
been worth the cost of U.S. lives and dollars, up to 51 percent.  [Figure 2.]  It also helps 
raise the share who feel the country is safer than three years ago – up 9 points since Au-
gust, to a 52 percent majority.  [Figure 3.]  The share who see the country safer since 9/11 





– in many ways, the more relevant point of reference – is even higher: up 5 points since 
August, to 66 percent.  [Figure 4.]  In part, these figures suggest that progressive groups 
and speakers are swimming against public opinion if they attack current policy on the 
grounds that it has made the U.S. “less safe.”   
 
 The current national security policies also enjoy a relatively high degree of sup-
port at this moment because the public – despite Saddam’s capture – remains focused on 
terrorism and other “hard” security concerns, relative to other foreign policy issues.  Four 
of the five top foreign policy and national security concerns for the public right now fall 
into this category, including: keeping America’s military strong (cited as extremely or 
very important to America’s well-being by 88 percent of respondents); controlling bio-
logical, chemical, and nuclear weapons and material (88 percent); fighting global terror-
ism (81 percent); and strengthening America’s homeland security (73 percent).  Among 
the list of progressive issues, only “fighting global diseases, like AIDS and tuberculosis” 
(77 percent) and “reducing America’s dependence on Middle East oil” (72 percent) ap-
proach the same levels of concern (we return to these issues later). [Figure 5.]   
 
 Yet even with these dynamics that tend to raise support for current security poli-
cies – such as Saddam’s capture and a continuing focus on terrorism and hard security 
issues – the public still shows a striking level of doubts about the direction of U.S. poli-
cies abroad.  Five concerns in particular dominate the public’s outlook: 
 
Deterioration of America’s image abroad.  First, the public is highly concerned 
that America’s current foreign policies hurt our image abroad, which undermines our 
own national security.  A 51-17 percent majority believes the U.S. is less rather than 
more liked and respected abroad than a few years ago – about the same result as we 
found in August 2003.1  The public worries that the decline in America’s image is a dan-
gerous trend, with a very strong 84 percent saying that the degree to which other coun-
tries like and respect us is important for our own foreign policy and national security. 
[Figure 6.]  This concern, which is closely tied to worries about the U.S. acting too much 
on its own abroad, emerges strongly in the focus groups as well; as one woman in Seattle 
says: “despite all of the things we give to other countries, the money, the food, whatever, 
Americans are still not looked on well in other countries.  Many countries dislike us.  
They hate us even.  And that concerns me.”   
 
Doubts about the truthfulness.  Second, the public exhibits a strong concern that 
it is not getting the truth about aspects of current foreign policy.  Nearly a quarter of the 
public (22 percent) ranks “Not telling us the truth, like on Iraq and weapons of mass de-
struction” as one of their top two concerns (chosen from a list of 10 options) about cur-
rent U.S. foreign policy – the second strongest concern on the list.  [Figure 7.]  While the 
                                                 
1
 In a March 2003 survey we conducted jointly with Public Opinion Strategies for the Vietnam Veterans of 
America Foundation, we found a 55 percent majority of civically engaged respondents thought the U.S. 
was less liked and respected than a year ago, and fully 81 percent felt it was important to our national secu-
rity that other countries like and respect the United States. 





concern about honesty mostly relates to Iraq and weapons of mass destruction, it bleeds 
into other issues as well. 
 
Public divided on Iraq, pre-emption, unilateralism.  Third, even at a point of 
relative strength for current U.S. foreign policy, a clear majority of the public remains 
unconvinced about the conceptual pillars of our foreign policy, such as the Iraq war, and 
the principles of pre-emption and unilateralism.  In other words, even at a moment when 
the public applauds certain results of U.S. foreign policy, such as the capture of Saddam, 
it is still split over the rationales.   
 
 As noted earlier, only a slim 51 percent majority feels the war in Iraq has been 
worth the cost – even in the immediate aftermath of Saddam’s capture. Similarly, on the 
idea of pre-emption, the public splits only narrowly in favor when presented with con-
trasting statements for and against the concept, 50-46 percent (which we discuss further 
below).2  [Figure 8.] In the same way, the argument for greater reliance on unilateral ac-
tion earns only a 49-46 percent plurality.  [Figure 9.]  Concerns over the United States’ 
go-it-alone approach emerge with particular force in the focus groups; as a man in Des 
Moines says: “I think we’ve isolated ourselves from the rest of the world.  Basically, 
we’ve shoved our super power down the throats of some countries and tried to with other 
countries who’ve resisted.”   
 
American over-extension.  The fourth concern about current U.S. foreign policy – 
although it is also a potential obstacle for advocates of an alternative foreign policy as 
well – is the sense that the U.S. is over-extended abroad, spending too much time and 
money on foreign problems and too little on problems at home.  The view is less outright 
isolationism, and more a desire for “minimalist internationalism” – a feeling that the U.S. 
has a role to play abroad, but that it should not do too much.  In particular, the public is 
troubled by the sense that the U.S. is acting too much on its own in world events, which 
they sense leads to higher costs, and they express a desire for greater cooperation with 
other countries in addressing security challenges. That feeling is likely exacerbated right 
now by lingering reactions to a slow economy and the costs and casualties of the Iraq 
war.   
 
 The public’s third strongest concern about current U.S. foreign policy is that we 
are “spending too much time and money on problems abroad,” cited by 18 percent as one 
of their top two concerns. [Figure 10.]  Also, by a 51-40 percent majority, the public says 
“we should focus more on problems in our own country like health care and education, 
rather than devoting so many resources to foreign aid to help other countries” (and rejects 
an alternative statement that says, “September 11 shows that as we must attend to prob-
lems at home, we also cannot ignore problems like poverty, repression, and extremism in 
other countries, and need to play an active role with other countries to address them”).  
                                                 
2
 In testing the concept of pre-emption, all respondents hear one argument in favor of pre-emption; different 
half samples hear two different arguments in opposition; the figures here represent the average result.  





[Figure 11.]  Similarly, nearly two thirds of civically engaged adults find it very or 
somewhat convincing that, “With millions of Americans lacking a job or health insur-
ance, we have enough problems at home – we can’t afford to keep spending so much 
time and money rebuilding other countries, like the additional 87 billion dollars just ap-
proved for Iraq.”   Unlike the issues of pre-emption and unilateralism, support for focus-
ing more on problems at home cuts across party, as well as gender.  
 
 This concern that we are over-extended abroad emerges in the focus groups, both 
in terms of money and casualties in global engagements:   
 
It seems like we are not focusing on our own people as much.  We are 
playing the commandant of the world a lot of times.  And we spend a lot of 
money over in Iraq and those places, and it doesn’t seem like we are pay-
ing as much attention to the problems we have here.  We are billions and 
billions of dollars into debt and it’s kind of like, why are we still paying 
for that?  [Seattle Men] 
 
 It [a statement in favor of engagement abroad] kind of made me go back 
to well, that’s nice that we spend globally, but what are we spending here 
at home?  I mean we still have poverty here.  We still have our problems.  
It almost offended me in a way.  Sorry. [Washington, DC Women] 
 
 It is worth noting which foreign policy dynamics do not greatly concern the pub-
lic at this point.  In particular, there is very little concern that the United States is “resort-
ing to military actions too quickly” (cited by only 10 percent as one of their two strongest 
concerns, the second least cited concern), or that we are “spending too much on the mili-
tary” (cited by 4 percent, the least cited factor).  Indeed, there is a strong concern that we 
are “under-funding our military” (the most cited concern, at 23 percent), although some 
focus group comments suggest this view is tied to the feeling of American over-extension 
we discussed earlier – that is, a sense that the U.S. has deployed its troops to too many 
places at once, with too little assistance from allies and friends abroad, resulting in the 
military’s resources being stretched too thin. 
 
 
Progressives Start with Good Standing 
 
 These concerns about current U.S. policies abroad create a range of opportunities 
for individuals and groups who advocate a progressive foreign policy agenda, even in the 
face of elevated support for current security policies.  It is also worth noting that the pub-
lic starts with a relatively favorable view of the constellation of progressive foreign pol-
icy groups and their issues.  Although opinion is divided along ideological lines in many 
cases, the progressive community mostly starts out as “good guys” in the debate over the 
country’s priorities abroad.  
 





 Although the U.S. military is by far the most popular player in the realm of Amer-
ica’s global activities (a mean rating of 86 degrees on a 0-100 “thermometer” scale to 
measure favorability), the public views most kinds of progressive foreign policy groups 
in solidly favorable terms, including “groups that work on global poverty and develop-
ment” (62 degrees); “human rights groups” (60 degrees); and “groups that work on the 
global environment” (58 degrees).  Specific organizations and agencies that work on pro-
gressive issues also generally receive favorable marks, including the Peace Corps (69 de-
grees); UNICEF (64 degrees); and CARE (59 degrees).  Both Amnesty International (50 
degrees) and Greenpeace (47 degrees) receive slightly lower ratings, in large part because 
opinion on these groups is polarized along lines of ideology.  [Figure 12.] 
 
 Additionally, the public generally sees the issues these progressive groups are ad-
dressing as important.  As noted earlier, around three quarters of the public sees “fighting 
global diseases, like AIDS and tuberculosis” (77 percent) and “reducing America’s de-
pendence on Middle East oil” (72 percent) as extremely or very important for America’s 
well being.  Majorities also recognize the importance of human rights (65 percent); pro-
moting health and education in poor countries (55 percent); contributing to international 
relief efforts (56 percent); and combating global warming (51 percent). [Figure 13.]  In 
the post-9/11 world, the American public does not place such issues at the top of its secu-
rity priorities, but they nonetheless see them as important, which opens the door for pro-
gressive groups to argue that they are being neglected, as we describe below. 
 
 
Getting Heard: The Importance of a Hard Security Frame 
 
  The research provides several insights on how progressive groups and speakers 
can capitalize on their favorable standing to get heard in the current opinion environment.  
The first and most important insight is that, when addressing the general public, they 
generally benefit from presenting their issues in some relation to the “hard” security 
agenda of terrorism and homeland security that is so much on the public’s mind at this 
point.  The research examines the impact of presenting progressive issues in three differ-
ent message frames:  
 
• Talking about the issue by itself, on its own merits (which we shorthand as 
the “A alone” message frame) 
 
• Talking about the hard security agenda first, and then pivoting to the pro-
gressive agenda. [“A + B”] 
 
• Arguing that the progressive agenda itself actually helps to advance the 
“hard” security agenda – for example, that combating poverty abroad will 
ease the conditions that contribute to extremism and terrorism. [“A = B”] 
 





 To explore this question, we conduct a set of controlled experiments across three 
sets of issues: development assistance, global warming and human rights.  On each issue, 
we randomly assign our survey respondents to one of the three groups.  One hears an “A 
alone” message on that issue; one hears an “A+B” message; one hears an “A=B” mes-
sage.  Although the results differ somewhat across the three issues, across all of them, the 
public is more receptive when we frame the progressive issue in some relation to the hard 
security agenda.  It is worth reviewing the results in each of the three issue areas. 
 
Development assistance.  As Table One indicates, the public is most responsive 
to arguments in favor of development assistance when they are preceded by some men-
tion of the hard security agenda – the “A+B” formulation.  The “A alone” development 
message, which makes the case for such assistance in its own right, performs worse than 
both of the other formulations, which frame development assistance in some relation to 
the hard security agenda, with only a bare majority (51 percent very or somewhat con-
vincing) supporting the “A alone” version, compared to 67 percent supporting the “A=B” 
formulation, and 77 percent supporting the “A+B” approach.  The dominance of the A+B 
formulation holds true across the key dividing lines of gender and education. 
 





% “very” or 
“somewhat 
convincing” 
“A alone”: Right now, the U.S. spends less per person on relieving 
global poverty, hunger, and disease than most major countries. As one 




“A+B”: In the wake of  9/11, our top priority is to strengthen homeland 
security and fight terrorism; but even as we do, we cannot forget about 
the other things we need to do in the world like helping to relieve global 
poverty, disease, and repression. 
 
77% 
“A=B”: Poverty and repression in places like Afghanistan can create a 
breeding ground for religious extremism and terrorism. By joining with 
other countries to fight global poverty, we can also help solve root 




 Human rights.  It is striking how much impact all three of the human rights mes-
sages have; this is an issue with particular resonance.  Even so, as Table Two shows, the 
strongest formulation here again is “A + B” – which says that while the U.S. works to 
root out terrorism, we must also speak out for human rights and religious freedom.  A 
strong 83 percent of the public feels the following statement is very or somewhat con-
vincing.  While the dominance of the “A+B” formulation holds for both men and women, 
the “A alone” frame – arguing human rights on its own merits – proves to be about 














% “very” or 
“somewhat 
convincing” 
“A alone”: The U.S. needs to speak out against regimes like Burma and 
China that violate human rights for women, political dissidents, and re-
ligious minorities. If we don't speak out for freedom, these issues too 
easily get ignored. 
 
77% 
“A+B”: Our work for security and freedom should go hand-in-hand.  
While we root out al Qaeda and the other terrorist networks, we also 
need to speak out for the kinds of human rights and religious freedoms 
that make us admired in much of the world. 
 
83% 
“A=B”: We should increase our efforts for human rights and religious 
freedom in other countries in part because free societies don't spawn the 
extremism and violence that can threaten us. By combating repression 





 Global warming and energy.  On global warming and energy, once again the 
strongest approach is to present the issue in some relation to the “hard” security agenda.  
In this case, however, there is great power in the “A=B” approach – arguing that by de-
veloping alternative energy sources, we will not only help reduce global warming, but 
reduce our vulnerability to Mideast instability as well.  This argument is convincing to 87 
percent of respondents – the strongest of any arguments made in the survey, either on be-
half of current U.S. policies or progressive alternatives.  The strong response to this ar-
gument – which reinforces earlier, similar findings from our surveys for the Democracy 
Corps project* – provides particularly strong evidence that, even now, progressive groups 
and speakers can get a full hearing on their issues if they frame their issues in the best 
way.  The dominance of the “A=B” frame, which emphasizes the link between alternative 
energy and less dependence on the Mideast, holds true across lines of ideology, gender, 





                                                 
*
 The Democracy Corps August 2003 survey found that 75 percent of civically engaged respondents found 
it very or somewhat convincing that the war in Iraq proves we need an energy policy which invests in alter-
native sources of energy – making the U.S. less dependent on the Mideast and their oil. 












% “very” or 
“somewhat 
convincing” 
“A alone”: We need to combat global warming or else it may change 
global weather and increase flooding in major cities in the coming dec-
ades. The U.S. produces a quarter of the world's carbon pollution, and 
needs to help lead the way to a solution. 
 
66% 
“A+B”: The immediate threat to our security comes from terrorism and 
dangerous regimes with deadly weapons. But we also need to keep our 
eye on longer-term dangers, like global warming, which could cause 
major destruction in the future unless we take action. 
 
70% 
“A=B”: The war in Iraq proves we need an energy policy to make us 
less dependent on oil from the unstable Middle East.  Developing alter-
native fuels, like solar, hydrogen, and wind power, will increase our en-





 Our focus groups suggest that this message makes participants receptive to argu-
ments about global warming by placing the issue in a new frame that is linked to their 
current concerns about the Mideast.  As one Seattle woman says:  “I’ve been so luke-
warm on most of the other [statements]. But this one, it said the war in Iraq proves that 
we need an energy policy.  As in, like a strategy, a focus, a plan that makes us less de-
pendent on oil from the unstable Middle East.  In my opinion, that’s the most honest 
thing I’ve seen here. That’s why we went in.  It had a lot to do about oil.  And so we are 
kind of killing two birds with one stone.  And also addressing global warming.” 
Similarly, a woman in one of our Washington, D.C. opinion former focus groups says:  
“The thing that really made me [agree] so strongly …[is that] we need an energy policy 
that makes us less dependent on oil from overseas.  And, after I read that then the global 
warming just seemed like it would be a great thing to go along with it.”  
 
 At least across these three sets of issues, progressive messengers get the strongest 
response when they frame their issues alongside the hard security agenda.  The comments 
from focus group participants help to explain why.  Terrorism and Iraq are on the public’s 
mind, and Americans want some acknowledgement that these are the top priorities right 
now.  Once that idea is expressed, however, the public becomes more receptive to the no-
tion that America’s foreign policy agenda must encompass a broader range of issues in 
order to address the full range of global challenges.  It is partly a matter of connecting 
with the public’s sense of priorities.  As a woman in Iowa states: “I think our main prior-
ity is protecting ourselves.  That’s the bottom line.  Clear and simple.”  Similarly, a 
woman in Seattle suggests the need for a kind of sequencing – security before good 





deeds:  “Somewhere you have to have a strength and a basis – if we can be strong and 
unified and ward off terrorism, then there is a basis we can work from [in the rest of the 
world].”   
 
As a result of such sentiments, there is a danger that if progressive groups and 
speakers are mute on the hard security agenda, they will gain less of a hearing than they 
otherwise might.  It may well be that the need for this kind of a frame will change over 
time, particularly if concerns about terrorism and Iraq recede.  Moreover, the optimal 
frame depends on the issue: a hard security frame emerges as less essential on human 
rights; on energy, there is particular credibility to asserting that alternative fuels may help 
reduce our vulnerability to Mideast instability.  This is not a one-size-fits-all exercise; but 
the results do suggest that the public is generally more receptive to the progressive 
agenda when progressive groups and speakers also take some steps to address current 
concerns over terrorism, Iraq, and other aspects of the “hard” security agenda.  
 
 
Other Implications for Framing a Progressive Foreign Policy  
 
 The research points to five additional insights for framing messages on progres-
sive foreign policy priorities in the current environment.   
 
The opportunity for stronger progressive arguments: the example of pre-
emption.  First, there are real opportunities to build on the doubts that substantial portions 
of the public have with key elements of the current foreign policy framework.  For exam-
ple: we noted before that opinion is divided on the idea of pre-emption; but with the right 
message frame, it is possible to generate stronger opposition to that concept.  Many ob-
servers have argued against pre-emption by arguing that if the U.S. acts pre-emptively we 
may look like a “global bully”; yet this argument loses in a match-up against a statement 
in favor of pre-emption, by a 41-54 percent margin.  An alternative approach does sig-
nificantly better: by emphasizing that pre-emption goes against the “long-standing 
American tradition” of not attacking until we are attacked or imminently threatened, this 
approach generates a clear 51-46 percent majority against pre-emption. [Figure 14.] 
 
Audience matters.  The second point is that the best message frame for progres-
sive foreign policy ideas often depend heavily on the audience – whether one is talking to 
the general public, opinion formers, activists, or experts.  For example, on the question of 
pre-emption, as we just saw, when addressing the public as a whole, it is more effective 
to appeal to the tradition of not attacking first, rather than warning that the U.S. risks 
looking like a bully.  However, the effectiveness of this approach derives from its 
stronger appeal to moderates and conservatives (which makes sense: tradition is a con-
servative notion).  Yet, for a liberal audience – a group of activists, perhaps – it is signifi-
cantly more effective to argue that a policy of pre-emption risks alienating other coun-
tries.  [Figure 15.]  While the current research did not try to identify the optimal message 





frame for all combinations of issues and audiences, it does underscore the importance of 
matching one’s approach to the audience at hand. 
 
Long-term investments in capacity.  Third, the research points to an important in-
sight about messages on development assistance – the potential power of messages that 
emphasize the value of long-term capacity building.  A message that emphasizes “in-
vestments that help people in other countries help themselves over the long term” 
emerges as somewhat more effective than one that stresses the imperative of responding 
to famines, disasters, and epidemics (83 percent very or somewhat convincing for the 
former message, versus 78 percent for the latter message).  The difference is even greater 
among opinion formers (87 versus 80 percent).  While the survey reveals only minor dif-
ferences in impact from referring to help for other countries as “development assistance” 
rather than “foreign aid,” the concept of teaching people how to help themselves strikes a 
chord.  As a woman in one of our Iowa focus groups says:  “Teaching them how to take 
care of themselves helps them more in the long run, and helps our country better in the 
long run.” 
 
Key drivers of opinion: gender, location, and education.  Fourth, the research 
underscores that there are a few basic drivers of the public’s reactions to messages about 
progressive issues.  The most powerful are gender, location and education. 
 
• Gender.  Another key driver is gender; as we have found in past research, gender 
differences explain a great deal of opinion differences on a range of national secu-
rity and foreign policy issues.  Relative to men, women are more worried about 
security (39 percent of women fee less safe than three years ago, compared to 
only 29 percent of men), less supportive of the war in Iraq (46 percent of women 
say it has not been worth the cost, compared to 37 percent of men), and more sup-
portive of progressive concepts, such as generally not attacking pre-emptively (56 
percent of women oppose pre-emption, compared to 44 percent of men).  Addi-
tionally, women are generally more favorable toward progressive groups, such as 
human rights organizations, and progressive issues, such as working to protect the 
global environment.  [Figure 16.] 
 
• Regional differences.  The differences between the country’s cosmopolitan 
coastal areas and its rural heartland are pronounced in this survey.  People on the 
coasts are less likely to feel the current government has improved the country’s 
security since 2000, compared to those in the heartland region (64 percent com-
pared to 76 percent), are less likely to feel the war in Iraq was worth the cost of 
lives and dollars (48 percent compared to 58 percent), and are more willing to fo-
cus on global problems (47 percent compared to 57 percent).   
 
• Education.  Education also exerts a strong influence – in particular, creating more 
of a willingness to act on international issues.  For example, by an 11 point mar-
gin, 51-40 percent, civically engaged adults as a whole say that the U.S. should 





focus more on problems at home and less on those abroad; in contrast, by a 5 
point margin, 43-48 percent, college-educated opinion formers favor the alterna-
tive statement, which stresses the need for working with other countries on global 
problems, even as we address priorities at home.   
 
Another variable that contributes to education about global issues is the degree to 
which Americans have traveled abroad.  While it is correlated to education, this 
variable turns out to have an even more powerful impact on whether people sup-
port addressing global problems.  For those who have not taken any trips abroad 
in the past 10 years – which accounts for 41 percent of adults – there is a 32 point 
preference for focusing on issues at home, 60-28 percent; but for those who have 
taken 7 or more trips during that period (13 percent of adults), there is a 28 point 
preference for addressing global issues, 33-61 percent. [Figure 17.] 
 
 Substantial support for U.S. foreign policies built on hope, and not just fear.  
Finally, the research suggests that there is a large base for a foreign policy agenda that is 
founded not only on fear of terrorism and foreign dangers, but also an optimistic determi-
nation to create a more peaceful and prosperous world.  As on so many foreign policy 
issues at this point, the public is closely divided on this question.  A 48 percent plurality 
feels that, “More than at most times in our history, the U.S. now is threatened and must 
take steps to protect its own people and security”; while 45 percent choose the alternative 
view that, “More than at most times in our history, the U.S. now has opportunities to help 
build a more peaceful world and ensure freedom and decent lives for more people around 
the world.”  [Figure 18.] 
 
 While it may be disappointing to many that the first statement attracts slightly 
more support, it is encouraging how closely divided civically engaged Americans are on 
this choice given the salience of terrorism and other direct threats to the public’s security.  
Moreover, many key parts of the public actually favor the latter statement stressing the 
opportunities for building peace, freedom, and better living conditions around the world.  
A majority of opinion formers favor this view (50-43 percent), along with majorities of 
younger people (51-45 percent of those under the age of 30), mothers (52-39 percent), 
Americans who have traveled abroad relatively often (53-40 percent among those who 
have taken at least 4 trips abroad over the past 10 years), and those living in big cities 
(56-38 percent in cities of over 1 million).  It may well be that as the public’s focus on 
9/11 and the Iraq war recedes, progressive groups and speakers will be able to build on 
this substantial foundation to build even broader support for a forward-looking U.S. for-
eign policy agenda.  
 
